top of page



Bonicalzi, S. (2019). Rethinking Moral Responsibility (Milano-Londra: Mimesis International). ISBN: 9788869772436.

Edited Volumes

Lavazza, A., Bonicalzi, S., De Caro, M., Marraffa, M., Pereboom, D., Eds. (2019). “The New Science of Free Will: The Epiphenomenalist Challenge to Freedom”. Frontiers in Psychology - Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, vol. 9. ISSN: 1664-1078

Bonicalzi, S., De Caro, M. (2013). “Free Will: Thirty Points of View”. Methode. Analytic Perspectives, Università di Torino, 2(3). ISSN: 2281-0498.


Bonicalzi, S., Caffo, L., Sorgon, M. (2014). Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing). ISBN (10): 1-4438-5673-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5673-7.

Journal Articles

Bonicalzi, S. (2019). “Agire o Non Agire. Il Ruolo dell’Omission Bias nei Giudizi Morali”. Notizie di Politeia, XXXV(136). ISSN 1128-2401.

Bonicalzi, S., Haggard, P. (2019). “From Freedom From to Freedom to: New Perspectives on Intentional Action”. Frontiers in Psychology, 10:1193. ISSN: 1664- 1078.


Bonicalzi, S., Haggard, P. (2019). “Responsibility Between Neuroscience and Criminal Law. The Control Component of Criminal Liability”. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 10: 103-119. ISSN: 2039-4667.


Bonicalzi, S., Gallotti, M. (2018). “The Participatory Dimension of Individual Responsibility”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41: 15-16 (e39). ISSN: 1469-1825.


Beyer, F., Sidarus, N., Bonicalzi, S., Haggard, P. (2017). “Beyond Self-Serving Bias: Diffusion of Responsibility Reduces Sense of Agency and Outcome Monitoring”. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(12):138-145. ISSN: 1749-5016.

Bonicalzi, S. (2016). “Enemy”. Quaderni della Ginestra, vol. 17: 1-3. ISSN: 2240-337X.

Bonicalzi, S. (2015). “Libet-Like Experiments and the Efficacy Of the Will”. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 6(1):130-144. ISSN: 2039-4667.


Bonicalzi, S. (2015). “Does reductivist event-causal compatibilism leave anything out? Lynne Baker’s reflective-endorsement and the bounds of the traditional analyses of moral responsibility”. Phenomenology and Mind. Naturalism, the First-Person Perspective and the Embodied Mind, 7:128-135.


Bonicalzi, S. (2014). “Upstream Color”. Quaderni della Ginestra, 13: 1-4. ISSN:2240-337X.


Bonicalzi, S. (2014). “Tony Manero”. Quaderni della Ginestra, 11: 1-6. ISSN: 2240-337X.


Bonicalzi, S. (2013). “Moral Responsibility Beyond Classical Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Accounts”. Prolegomena, 12(1):21-41. ISSN:1333-4395.

Bonicalzi, S., M. De Caro (2013). “Introduction”. In: Bonicalzi, S., De Caro, M., Eds., Free Will: Thirty Points of View. Methode. Analytic Perspectives, Università di Torino, 2(3): 1-4. ISSN: 2281-0498.

Bonicalzi, S. (2013). “Wes Anderson. Alla Ricerca dell’Attimo Perduto”. Close-Up, 5: 73-79. ISSN: 1827-4986.


Bonicalzi, S. (2013). “La Montagna Dipinta”. Fata Morgana, 21:157-163. ISSN: 1970-5786.


Bonicalzi, S. (2012). “L’Arte è un’Etica? Cinema ed Esperienza Morale”. Nude Review, III: 1-3. ISSN: 2280-420x.

Bonicalzi, S. (2011). “Umanità e Alterità in Montaigne e nei Moderni”. Itinera. Rivista di Filosofia e di Teoria delle Arti, Università degli Studi di Milano, 1: 2-38. ISSN: 2039-9251.

Book Chapters

Bonicalzi, S. (2019). “Actions and Intentions”. In: Feltz, B., Missal, M., Sims, A. C., Eds., Free Will, Causality and Neuroscience, Cognitive Science Series/Value Inquiry Series (Leiden: Brill). ISBN (print): 978-90-04-37291-7; ISBN (e-book): 978-90-04-40996-5.

Bonicalzi, S. (2014). “Defining Practical Reasoning. Constructivism and Instrumental Reason”. In: Bonicalzi, S., Caffo, L., Sorgon, M., Eds., Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 74-84. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5673-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5673-7.


Bonicalzi, S. (2014). “Skepticism and Control”. In: Bacchini, F., Dell’Utri, M., Caputo, S. Eds., New Advances in Causation, Agency, And Moral Responsibility (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 144-164. ISBN: 978-1- 4438-6625-5.

bottom of page